By James Loughton - Regular Contributor
(Photo: CCL)
Soldiers of fortune have been a salient feature of military history since the earliest records of warfare. Often described as the "second-oldest profession", mercenary work involves the participation in military conflict for personal profit with political loyalty dictated by the highest bidder. Once a standard practice by states engaging in warfare, mercenary work has become increasingly disapproved of by much of the world, with the Geneva Conventions refusing to recognise mercenaries as legitimate combatants. Despite this, the employment of irregular troops has seen notable coverage in 2023 as the prominent conflicts in Ukraine and Sudan feature mercenary warlords such as Yevgeny Prigozhin and Hemedti taking centre stage.
On 15 April, soldiers loyal to the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan launched attacks against the Sudanese Military around the capital city of Khartoum. The paramilitary force, which has engaged in mercenary activities in neighbouring regions, has challenged the legitimacy of the government through its demonstration of power. Then on 23 June, shockwaves were sent across the international community as the Wagner Group, a mercenary paramilitary funded by the Russian government, launched a large-scale rebellion, pulling out of Ukraine, taking control of multiple Russian cities and advancing towards Moscow in defiance against the Kremlin.
Thus the issues produced through the employment of mercenaries are as relevant today as they were 500 years ago when sellswords such as the Landsknecht or Condottiero dominated armies across Europe. One prominent thinker who spoke critically of the employment of mercenaries was rounded Italian Renaissance diplomat and philosopher, Niccolò Machiavelli. Amongst the backdrop of a disunited Italy consistently engulfed in political division and warfare, Machiavelli wrote The Prince, a seminal handbook for manoeuvring to solidify control and survival through political conquest. Chapters 12-14 of The Prince feature Machevilli's discussion on military expansion and defence, advising that a successful Prince should make use of his own personal army. Discarding mercenaries as unloyal liabilities that harm the self-sufficiency of a state, Machiavelli ravages the downfalls of mercenary employment:
I say, therefore, that the arms with which a prince defends his state are either his own, or they are mercenaries, auxiliaries, or mixed. Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if one holds his state based on these arms, he will stand neither firm nor safe; for they are disunited, ambitious, and without discipline, unfaithful, valiant before friends, cowardly before enemies; they have neither the fear of God nor fidelity to men, and destruction is deferred only so long as the attack is; for in peace one is robbed by them, and in war by the enemy.
Machiavelli's harsh language, lambasting irregular forces as both "useless and dangerous", highlights his opposition to political reliance on forces that cannot be directly controlled. For Machiavelli, politics is dominated by treachery, it must be both, employed by a prince if needed to advance one's own power and also defended against by actors seeking to advance their own agenda. Thus, the lack of personal loyalty to a prince makes mercenaries dangerous; adherence to profit only assures that these soldiers will fight so long as wealth is readily
available. Competing powers may sway loyalty through greater wealth, or equally as challenging, mercenaries may see it fit to take up their own action in defiance of their benefactors if the opportunity presents itself. It is for this reason that Machiavelli places particular emphasis on an aversion to battle-proven successful mercenaries:
The mercenary captains are either capable men or they are not; if they are, you cannot trust them, because they always aspire to their own greatness, either by oppressing you, who are their master, or others contrary to your intentions;
The Prince's appeal to ruthless politics was a consequence of Italy's existence divided by minor competing city-states engaged in conflict whilst larger powers continued to influence and control Italian territories. Political stability and survival were key to any hope of uniting the Italian Peninsula however, historical precedence had proved that powerful mercenary forces were a serious disruption to a potential Italian major power. Machiavelli was justified in his disdain for mercenaries when analysing the Condotteiro. During the 15th century, feudal lords would make use of these hired soldiers, allowing for a rapid mobilisation of men without need for resources and time spent on training a personal military. Popular use of the Condotterio however, resulted in its leaders advancing beyond the battlefield, infiltrating the political elite and leveraging military prowess for influence. One such example Machiavelli makes use of is the Condotterior commander, Francesco Sforza, who turned on his Milanese clients, aligning with the enemy to seize the city of Milan for himself, establishing his own personal dynasty.
This example of mercenaries exceeding the military capability of their clients, ascending from the battlefield into politics, is exactly what Machevilli warns of. Whilst a paid-for army can bring short-term gain, the quasi-official relationship between client and provider relies on an uneasy power dynamic. The more successful a mercenary force is, the more likely they are to be used, the greater power leverage they possess. The examples of the RSF and Wagner are evidence of this.
Founded in 2013, the Rapid Support Forces were formed from local Janjaweed militias to combat an anti-government insurgency during the War in Darfur. The auxiliary force employed a violent crackdown on anti-government forces that the Sudanese military had been unable to deal with. Spearheaded by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, commonly referred to as "Hemedti", the RSF saw great success eventually expanding into operations beyond Darfur. RSF forces would later be used to guard prosperous gold mines, building up personal wealth for Hemedti; RSF soldiers would also be hired by Saudi, UAE and Libyan governments to fight against Houthi and National Accord forces in separate conflicts. The Sudanese government's reliance on the RSF combined with its accumulation of wealth and geopolitical influence elevated Hemedti to the government, and in April, following long-term dispute with the Sudanese military, he was provided with the opportunity to openly revolt against the government.
Similarly, the Wagner Group was founded in 2014 as a private military company with close connections to the Kremlin. Formed by former Russian intelligence officers and funded by a prominent oligarch, Yevgeny Prighozin, the group saw widespread deployment from the Central African Republic to Ukraine. Employed by governments and militaries dealing with internal conflict, Wagner developed a highly-efficient specialised fighting force, capable of securing important economic and military objectives for the highest bidder. Prighozin's close connections with Putin served useful after military setbacks during the invasion of Ukraine left the Kremlin desperate for reinforcements. Wagner rapidly increased in size and power, deploying in key battles such as Solendar and Bakhmut, where its forces succeeded in costly objectives despite Russian military failures. Fast forward to June 2023 and Pirghozin had become one of the most important military figures in the war, using this newfound relevance to launch a rebellion against the Kremlin following months of dispute with the Russian military high command.
Both examples demonstrate exactly what Machiavelli warned against; short-term military gain inevitably leads to long-term shifting in power dynamics unfavourable to state actors. The pronounced risks of relying on mercenaries beg the question, why do states continue to engage in it? Machiavelli establishes that a state must be built upon a foundation of "good laws", mercenaries violate this due to their lack of "fear of God" and propensity for destruction. Such brutality however can be useful. The Kremlin used Wagner as an unofficial conduit to preserve and promote Russian foreign policy, brutal massacres committed by Wagner such as the Moura massacre in Mali, ruthlessly enforced the Malian government's authority strengthening Russian interests in the region whilst providing plausible deniability on the international stage. Likewise, the Khartoum massacre in Sudan saw RSF soldiers open fire on hundreds of anti-government protesters, suppressing dissidence without directly connecting the government to crimes against humanity.
How then can states avoid the mercenary trap that the Kremlin and Sudanese military have fallen into? Machiavelli sees some benefits to using irregular forces, their mass adoption throughout Renaissance Italy is not without reason, thus he provides an example of how a Prince can successfully prevent a mercenary power challenge. He points to the actions of Italian cardinal and former Condottiero turned statesman, Cesare Borgia:
I shall never hesitate to cite Cesare Borgia and his actions. This duke entered the Romagna with auxiliaries, taking there only French soldiers, and with them he captured Imola and Forli; but afterwards, such forces not appearing to him reliable, he turned to mercenaries, discerning less danger in them, and enlisted the Orsini and Vitelli; whom presently, on handling and finding them doubtful, unfaithful, and dangerous, he destroyed and turned to his own men.
Borgia's ruthlessness saw him use mercenary forces to his own advantage before then disposing of them upon early signs of disloyalty. For a successful state actor to survive, they must be willing to adapt in the face of potential weakness. Such Machiavellian tactics could have prevented Putin from an international embarrassment, his permittance of Prighozin's accumulation of power in direct competition with the Russian military already had numerous war analysts inside and outside of Russia hypothesising a potential mutiny. Hemedti's involvement in the 2019 coup d'etat which saw the Sudanese Armed Forces overthrow President Omar al-Bashir, the RSF's main financier, should have proved to the military of the RSF's dangerous propensity for treachery.
The Prince continues to remain politically relevant, as major conflicts erupt across the globe involving the use of mercenaries his understandings of state-craft and security provide important lessons for governments and militaries. It is unlikely that the failures of the Sudanese and Russian governments to contain paramilitary forces disconnected from hierarchal power will prevent the future use of hired guns, however, these most recent disasters may result in a greater appreciation for Machiavellian teachings.
I say, therefore, that the arms with which a prince defends his state are either his own, or they
are mercenaries, auxiliaries, or mixed. Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous;
and if one holds his state based on these arms, he will stand neither firm nor safe; for they are
disunited, ambitious, and without discipline, unfaithful, valiant before friends, cowardly before
enemies; they have neither the fear of God nor fidelity to men, and destruction is deferred only
so long as the attack is; for in peace one is robbed by them, and in war by the enemy.
Machiavelli's harsh language, lambasting irregular forces as both "useless and dangerous",
highlights his opposition to political reliance on forces that cannot be directly controlled. For
Machiavelli, politics is dominated by treachery, it must be both, employed by a prince if needed
to advance one's own power and also defended against by actors seeking to advance their own
agenda. Thus, the lack of personal loyalty to a prince makes mercenaries dangerous;
adherence to profit only assures that these soldiers will fight so long as wealth is readily available. Competing powers may sway loyalty through greater wealth, or equally as
challenging, mercenaries may see it fit to take up their own action in defiance of their
benefactors if the opportunity presents itself. It is for this reason that Machiavelli places
particular emphasis on an aversion to battle-proven successful mercenaries:
The mercenary captains are either capable men or they are not; if they are, you cannot trust
them, because they always aspire to their own greatness, either by oppressing you, who are their master, or others contrary to your intentions.
The Prince's appeal to ruthless politics was a consequence of Italy's existence divided by minor competing city-states engaged in conflict whilst larger powers continued to influence and control Italian territories. Political stability and survival were key to any hope of uniting the Italian Peninsula however, historical precedence had proved that powerful mercenary forces were a serious disruption to a potential Italian major power. Machiavelli was justified in his disdain for mercenaries when analysing the Condotteiro. During the 15th century, feudal lords would make use of these hired soldiers, allowing for a rapid mobilisation of men without need for resources and time spent on training a personal military. Popular use of the Condotterio however, resulted in its leaders advancing beyond the battlefield, infiltrating the political elite and leveraging military prowess for influence. One such example Machiavelli makes use of is the Condotterior commander, Francesco Sforza, who turned on his Milanese clients, aligning with the enemy to seize the city of Milan for himself, establishing his own personal dynasty.
This example of mercenaries exceeding the military capability of their clients, ascending from
the battlefield into politics, is exactly what Machevilli warns of. Whilst a paid-for army can bring
short-term gain, the quasi-official relationship between client and provider relies on an uneasy
power dynamic. The more successful a mercenary force is, the more likely they are to be used,
the more they are used, the greater power leverage they possess. The examples of the RSF
and Wagner are evidence of this.
Founded in 2013, the Rapid Support Forces were formed from local Janjaweed militias to
combat an anti-government insurgency during the War in Darfur. The auxiliary force employed a
violent crackdown on anti-government forces that the Sudanese military had been unable to
deal with. Spearheaded by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, commonly referred to as "Hemedti", the
RSF saw great success eventually expanding into operations beyond Darfur. RSF forces would
later be used to guard prosperous gold mines, building up personal wealth for Hemedti; RSF
soldiers would also be hired by Saudi, UAE and Libyan governments to fight against Houthi and
National Accord forces in separate conflicts. The Sudanese government's reliance on the RSF
combined with its accumulation of wealth and geopolitical influence elevated Hemedti to the
government, and in April, following long-term dispute with the Sudanese military, he was
provided with the opportunity to openly revolt against the government.
Similarly, the Wagner Group was founded in 2014 as a private military company with close
connections to the Kremlin. Formed by former Russian intelligence officers and funded by a
prominent oligarch, Yevgeny Prighozin, the group saw widespread deployment from the Central African Republic to Ukraine. Employed by governments and militaries dealing with internal conflict, Wagner developed a highly-efficient specialised fighting force, capable of securing important economic and military objectives for the highest bidder. Prighozin's close connections with Putin served useful after military setbacks during the invasion of Ukraine left the Kremlin desperate for reinforcements. Wagner rapidly increased in size and power, deploying in key battles such as Solendar and Bakhmut, where its forces succeeded in costly objectives despite Russian military failures. Fast forward to June 2023 and Pirghozin had become one of the most important military figures in the war, using this newfound relevance to launch a rebellion against the Kremlin following months of dispute with the Russian military high command.
Both examples demonstrate exactly what Machiavelli warned against; short-term military gain
inevitably leads to long-term shifting in power dynamics unfavourable to state actors. The
pronounced risks of relying on mercenaries beg the question, why do states continue to engage
in it? Machiavelli establishes that a state must be built upon a foundation of "good laws",
mercenaries violate this due to their lack of "fear of God" and propensity for destruction. Such
brutality however can be useful. The Kremlin used Wagner as an unofficial conduit to preserve
and promote Russian foreign policy, brutal massacres committed by Wagner such as the Moura
massacre in Mali, ruthlessly enforced the Malian government's authority strengthening Russian
interests in the region whilst providing plausible deniability on the international stage. Likewise,
the Khartoum massacre in Sudan saw RSF soldiers open fire on hundreds of anti-government
protesters, suppressing dissidence without directly connecting the government to crimes against
humanity.
How then can states avoid the mercenary trap that the Kremlin and Sudanese military have
fallen into? Machiavelli sees some benefits to using irregular forces, their mass adoption
throughout Renaissance Italy is not without reason, thus he provides an example of how a
Prince can successfully prevent a mercenary power challenge. He points to the actions of Italian
cardinal and former Condottiero turned statesman, Cesare Borgia:
I shall never hesitate to cite Cesare Borgia and his actions. This duke entered the Romagna
with auxiliaries, taking there only French soldiers, and with them he captured Imola and Forli;
but afterwards, such forces not appearing to him reliable, he turned to mercenaries, discerning
less danger in them, and enlisted the Orsini and Vitelli; whom presently, on handling and finding
them doubtful, unfaithful, and dangerous, he destroyed and turned to his own men.
Borgia's ruthlessness saw him use mercenary forces to his own advantage before then
disposing of them upon early signs of disloyalty. For a successful state actor to survive, they
must be willing to adapt in the face of potential weakness. Such Machiavellian tactics could
have prevented Putin from an international embarrassment, his permittance of Prighozin's
accumulation of power in direct competition with the Russian military already had numerous war
analysts inside and outside of Russia hypothesising a potential mutiny. Hemedti's involvement in
the 2019 coup which saw the Sudanese Armed Forces overthrow President Omar al-Bashir, the
RSF's main financier, should have proved to the military of the RSF's dangerous propensity for
treachery.
The Prince continues to remain politically relevant, as major conflicts erupt across the globe
involving the use of mercenaries his understandings of state-craft and security provide important
lessons for governments and militaries. It is unlikely that the failures of the Sudanese and
Russian governments to contain paramilitary forces disconnected from hierarchal power will
prevent the future use of hired guns, however, these most recent disasters may result in a
greater appreciation for Machiavellian teachings.
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